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A WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF: A CASE FOR
STRONGER LEGAL PROTECTION OF
ENCRYPTION
Benjamin Folkinshteyn†
Abstract
This Article examines the application of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination to compelled disclosure of
unencrypted data.
Such disclosure can include provision of
passwords to access encrypted data as well as, increasingly,
providing unencrypted data after compelled decryption.
The pervasiveness and persistence of electronic data drastically
increases the availability of information with potential evidentiary
value that has not previously existed with physical evidence. The
courts have struggled with finding the appropriate balance in
determining the scope and applicability of the privilege against selfincrimination to electronic evidence. The lack of precise physical
world analogues to encryption has led to particular difficulties in this
regard. I argue that encrypted data deserves broader consideration
under the Fifth Amendment than heretofore established by relevant
precedent. The changing technology should not be used as a reason
to eviscerate the privilege against self-incrimination.
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INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of electronic data and digitization, both as a
storage medium and communication, has been a boon to law
enforcement. In particular, technologically enhanced surveillance
techniques, off-site storage, and “cloud” computing have dramatically
increased the amount of information available to law enforcement.
The pervasiveness and persistence of such electronic data drastically
increases the availability of information with potential evidentiary
value that has not previously existed with physical evidence.
Electronic data has also presented a number of challenges. The
business community and individuals are increasingly aware and
protective of their electronic data (from prying eyes, both lawful and
unlawful) as the use of such data exponentially increases.
Stakeholders have attempted to secure such data by encryption.
Encryption can prevent even the most determined and
technologically-equipped third party from discovering the contents
without the requisite passwords.
Encryption technology presents an obstacle to those who seek to
gain access for traditionally illicit purposes, e.g., to misappropriate
money or property of another. It is also presents an obstacle to those
who desire to gather information in pursuit of a law enforcement
function.1 Law enforcement personnel may come upon encrypted
data in a variety of ways, including from electronic wiretapping or
eavesdropping, seizing evidence, or seeking documentary evidence
from a witness or defendant through use of a subpoena.
This paper examines the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination as it applies to encryption. It examines a
variety of situations in which a defendant or witness may be
compelled to disclose unencrypted forms of encrypted data (including
documents and electronic mail) alleged to be in his possession, either
through provision of passwords to decrypt the data or through the
provision of underlying data after compelled decryption. Part I of the
paper discusses the basics of the cryptographic process. It presents a
four-scenario framework which illustrates the circumstances under
which self-incrimination conflicts with law enforcement interests.
Part II provides an overview of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence and
the judicial gloss on the individual’s ability to exercise the right

1. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the variety of law enforcement
functions for which information gathering is an essential part, as well as the constitutional
limitations of such functions.
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against self-incrimination. Parts III and IV discuss the relevant
judicial decisions tackling Fifth Amendment issues in the context of
encrypted data. Part V covers the various analogies courts and
commentators have used in debating the appropriateness of the
privilege against self-incrimination in resisting disclosure. Part VI
proposes that in the context of illegal content, courts should be
particularly mindful of compelling disclosure. Part VII cautions
against overreaction to perceived threats from encryption to law
enforcement and points to pre-existing drastic capabilities of law
enforcement in electronic surveillance. Finally, Part VIII discusses
the latest developments in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with
respect to electronically stored information. The paper concludes by
calling for a careful balancing of the various law enforcement and
individual interests in order to avoid creating unintended negative
effects on constitutional protections of individual rights.
I.

WHAT IS ENCRYPTION?

Encryption is a process by which the content of a particular
message or document becomes unintelligible to a third party by a
predesignated scrambling protocol.2 As a simple example, imagine
that Bob wants to convey a number to Alice over an observable and
interceptable transmission medium (such as an email, a letter in the
mail, or a shout across a crowded room), without anyone being able to
tell what the number actually is. To accomplish this task, Bob and
Alice could agree in secret that before transmitting his message, Bob
will add 143 to the real number. Thus, when Bob wants to convey the
number 20, he will actually send the “encrypted” message of 163.
Alice can easily “decrypt” it by subtracting 143 and realize that the
real message is 20. No other observer can determine what the real
message is without knowing the encryption protocol (addition), or the
particular encryption key (143). Real-world ciphers in use today are
more complex for a number of reasons, but this example serves to
illustrate the basic framework under discussion.
A related concept is steganography which is employed to hide
the very existence of a message from the third party.3 Thinking back
to our example of Alice and Bob, imagine that Bob not only wants to
convey a message to Alice via a publicly observable medium, but also
wants to do it in such a way that observers do not realize a message
2.

SIMON SINGH, THE CODE BOOK: THE SCIENCE OF SECRECY FROM ANCIENT EGYPT
6 (2000).
Id. at 5.

TO QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY

3.
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was transmitted. Again, in private, Bob and Alice will agree on a
scheme ahead of time. Then Bob posts some flyers around town
saying something like, “Join the Springfield Baking Club on Friday,
October 20, for a baking presentation, to be held at the Basketball
court on 3rd and Spruce. Rain or shine. We will talk about
sourdough and tofu breads.” Because Bob and Alice agreed that the
message will be conveyed via the number of non-whitespace
characters in a flyer about the Springfield Baking Club, Alice
correctly gets the message of “163” and subtracts 143 to get the real
message of 20. We assume that they agreed to keep the same
encryption scheme as before. Everyone else can observe the message,
but doesn't know there was a secret message hidden within, or who it
was intended for.
Modern encryption software can be roughly categorized into
“file-level encryption” and “disk-level encryption.”
File-level
encryption allows the user to encrypt the contents of individual files.
The presence of the file and the file metadata—filename, modification
and access dates, file size—remain available to an attacker who gains
possession of the storage medium. Email encryption software, such
as GNU Privacy Guard (GPG), falls into this category, since each
email is encrypted individually for transmission. The existence of the
message as well as the sender and recipient are known to observers.
Disk-level encryption creates an encrypted container on the entire
disk so that all files stored are automatically encrypted into one giant
glob of bits. An attacker might suspect that the disk is not just filled
with gibberish and is likely encrypted, but would have no idea as to
the number and size of the files on the disk, if any, their names, or
possible content. Some software, such as TrueCrypt, goes a step
further and allows the creation of nested hidden volumes. Even if the
key/passphrase is revealed for the outer volume, there is no way to
tell if there are interior encrypted volumes with more data.4
Free and open source encryption software, along with the
knowledge of how to use it, is available to anyone with an Internet
connection. Without a passkey, it is impossible to decrypt data where
there is properly implemented, strong encryption software. Even law
enforcement agencies with large budgets and access to significant
computing power cannot decrypt such data. Where traditional
intelligence gathering and wiretapping techniques fail or are not
attempted prior to arrest, it has become necessary to seek cooperation
4. See Hidden Volume, TRUECRYPT,
volume#Y0 (last visited Nov. 2, 2013).

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/hidden-
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from defendants to divulge their passkeys despite assertions of Fifth
Amendment privilege.
The earliest Fifth Amendment encryption issue surfaced in
connection with the prosecution of Edward Leary, a disgruntled
computer analyst who planted two homemade gasoline bombs on a
train in Manhattan in December 1994, injuring dozens of people.5 In
the course of pretrial hearings, Leary refused to divulge his computer
password for “personal reasons” as his attorneys argued that such
disclosure would violate Leary’s Fifth Amendment rights.6 The
prosecution, in turn, asserted that self-incrimination was not at issue
since the requested “[code] words themselves don’t create evidence.”7
Judge Rena Uviller did not rule from the bench immediately, although
she analogized the request “to breaking a lock on a diary while
exercising a search warrant.”8 Ultimately, no judicial decision was
issued as the state’s forensics team was able to break Leary’s
password without his assistance.9
I propose that there are four types of fact scenarios which can
arise in the application of Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination to encrypted content. All of these permutations may be
encountered in situations where it may be necessary to seek a court
order compelling a defendant to divulge his passkey on penalty of
civil or criminal contempt. They are as follows: (1) content altogether
inaccessible and the substance of which is unknown, (2) content
initially accessible by law enforcement personnel which subsequently
became cryptographically inaccessible, (3) inaccessible content, the
substance of which later becomes collaterally apparent from other
sources, (4) content which becomes accessible after a duly issued
court order. Each of these scenarios requires a somewhat different
approach under current jurisprudence and, ultimately, a better
understanding of the nature of encryption and its relationship to selfincrimination.
II. BASIC OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reads, in relevant

5.

George James, Man Convicted in Bombings on Subway, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1996, at

6.

Barbara Ross, Bomb Suspect Won’t Yield Code, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 12, 1996, at

7.
8.
9.

Id.
Id.
Interview with Peter Casolaro, Assistant Dist. Attorney, N.Y. Cnty. (Feb. 4, 2013).

B4.
22.

FOLKINSHTEYN

2014]

4/27/2014 7:32 PM

A WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF

381

part, that “[n]o person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.”10 The early impetus for this privilege was
the prevention of confessions obtained through duress or torture.11 It
is also thought to logically flow from the fact that “the American
system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and
that the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay.”12 The
scope of the privilege encompasses all incriminating evidence used to
establish the accused’s guilt—such evidence must be “independently
and freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a charge against an
accused out of his own mouth.”13
The privilege, however, does not treat an individual as a “witness
against himself” under all circumstances. It “protects an accused only
from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide
the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.”14
To be deemed “testimonial,” the person’s “communication must
itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose
information.”15
As to documentary and physical evidence, the Fifth Amendment
applies to disclosures which are (1) compelled, (2) involve a
testimonial act, and (3) tend to incriminate the person so compelled.16
Additionally, even if documentary evidence is not in itself
testimonial, the act of production may be sufficiently testimonial to
give rise to Fifth Amendment protections.17
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 447 (1956) (“[T]here are indications in
the debates on the Constitution that the evil to be remedied was the use of torture to exact
confessions.”).
12. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964); see also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378
U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (“It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our
unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial, rather than an inquisitorial, system of
criminal justice . . . .”).
13. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8. The privilege is construed to include not only those
proceedings where a person’s testimony is sought in his own criminal prosecution, but also “that
a person shall not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony
which may tend to show that he himself has committed a crime.” Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547, 547 (1892).
14. Doe v. United States (Doe I), 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988) (requiring defendant to sign a
consent form authorizing foreign banks to disclose any and all accounts which defendant may
have with the banks does not violate the Fifth Amendment).
15. Id.
16. United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1979) (production of brass
knuckles).
17. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976) (“The act of producing evidence in
response to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from
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Two recent oft-cited Supreme Court decisions inform the
discussion on self-incrimination through compelled production of
documents by the defendant. In Fisher, defendant taxpayers had
given certain tax documents prepared by their accountants to their
attorneys in the course of two IRS investigations.18 The IRS sought
production of these documents from the taxpayers’ attorneys.19 The
Supreme Court held, in relevant part, that the documents were not
entitled to Fifth Amendment protection and, more importantly, that
the act of production itself is not testimonial because in that particular
instance “implicitly admitting the existence and possession of the
papers [does not rise] to the level of testimony within the protection
of the Fifth Amendment.”20 As a practical matter, “[t]he existence
and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion and the taxpayer
adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government’s
information by conceding that he in fact has the papers.”21
The flip side of Fisher is Hubbell where, subsequent to a grant of
immunity by the Government, the defendant produced thousands of
pages of documents pursuant to a grand jury subpoena.22 In
dismissing the grand jury indictment based in part on the content of
the immunized documents, the Supreme Court held that the foregone
conclusion rationale did not apply to the defendant’s production
(which was also entitled to derivative use immunity) because “the
Government has not shown that it had any prior knowledge of either
the existence or the whereabouts of the [documents] ultimately
produced.”23
The Court further held that with respect to the defendant’s
response to the broadly worded eleven categories of documents
sought by the subpoena requests, the collation and gathering of
documents necessarily required the defendant to divulge “the contents
of his own mind” and that such production was akin to “telling an
inquisitor the combination to a wall safe, not like being forced to
surrender the key to a strongbox.”24
Even if a defendant or witness exercises his right against selfthe contents of the papers produced.”). See also United States v. Doe (Doe II), 465 U.S. 605,
612 (1984) (production of subpoenaed records of a sole proprietorship).
18. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 394.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 411.
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
23. Id. at 44-45.
24. Id. at 43.
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incrimination in appropriate circumstances, he can still be compelled
to testify when granted use and derivative use immunity pursuant to
18 U.S.C Section 6002 or similar state statutes. The Supreme Court
has held that such immunity is “coextensive with the privilege and
suffices to supplant it.”25 State practice differs and may provide for
more or less protection than the federal rules.26
III. INACCESSIBLE AND UNKNOWN CONTENT
Very few courts, and no circuit court prior to 2012, have dealt
with compulsion of disclosure of encrypted data in decrypted form.
Those courts struggled with the nature of encryption. They also
struggled with the consequences of and differences in compelling a
defendant to produce either the unencrypted content, or the passwords
that would allow the Government to access the unencrypted content.
The most recent circuit court case represents the first scenario
proposed and, perhaps, the easiest to resolve on the facts alone.
A. Facts and Legal Issues
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011
(Doe) from the Eleventh Circuit is the latest and the only appellate
decision to date that discusses the issues head on.27 The case arose
out of a lawful seizure of several hard drives allegedly belonging to
the defendant (Doe) during a child pornography investigation.28 In
the course of the investigation, law enforcement officers determined
that Doe accessed the Internet from Internet Protocol addresses
assigned to certain hotels. 29 Eventually, the officers applied for a
search warrant to Doe’s room when he was tracked to a hotel in
California.30 In the process of executing the search warrant, several
large external hard drives and other storage media were seized.31
When the Government’s forensic examiners attempted to analyze the
data on the hard drives, they were unable to access certain portions of

25. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972).
26. Absent a waiver, New York State automatically provides for transactional immunity
to witnesses testifying in a legal proceeding, such as in front of a Grand Jury. See N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW §§ 50.10, 190.40.
27. In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011 (United States v.
Doe), 670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012).
28. Id. at 1339.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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those drives because they were strongly encrypted.32
As a result, the Government sought and obtained a grand jury
subpoena, requiring Doe to “produce the unencrypted contents of the
digital media, and any and all containers or folders thereon.”33 Doe
challenged the subpoena on Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
grounds.34 To overcome the challenge, the Government requested
that Doe be granted immunity “limited to the use [of Doe’s] act of
production of the unencrypted contents.”35 The district court granted
the Government’s request.36 Nevertheless, Doe, appearing before the
grand jury, refused to decrypt the hard drives on Fifth Amendment
grounds because the grant of immunity did not cover derivative use of
his testimony, i.e., the decryption.37 At the order to show cause
hearing, Doe argued that the Government at trial would need to prove
that “(1) the hard drives belonged to [him] (which was not in dispute)
and (2) contained child pornography.”38 Since the grant of immunity
was limited to act-of-production immunity, proving the second point
would be a result of the derivative use of his testimony since “by
decrypting the contents, he would be testifying that he, as opposed to
some other person, placed the contents on the hard drive, encrypted
the contents, and could retrieve and examine them whenever he
wished.”39 The district court did not accept Doe’s position, finding
that Doe’s decryption and production is not testimonial and found him
to be in contempt.40
In overturning the lower court, the Eleventh Circuit held that it
was an error (1) to consider Doe’s decryption and production of hard
drives as a non-testimonial act not entitled to Fifth Amendment
protections and (2) to limit the grant of immunity to use immunity
only, thus allowing the Government derivative use of the contents of
the hard drives once they are disclosed.41
B. Reasoning
There was no dispute that the production and decryption of the
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d at 1338.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1339.
Id. at 1339-40.
In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d at 1340.
Id. at 1341.
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data was both compelled and incriminatory within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment.42 The core of the Doe decision rested on the
analysis of whether “the Government sought testimony within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment” in seeking the production of
decrypted contents of Doe’s computer.43
1. Little Protection for Voluntarily Created Documents
As a general matter, pre-existing documents voluntarily created
by the person from whom they are sought are not deemed to be
protected under the Fifth Amendment because their creation was not
initially compelled.44 They are not protected despite the fact that they
may contain incriminating statements, since the privilege “protects a
person only against being incriminated by his compelled testimonial
communications.”45 Thus, the court had no difficulty determining
that as a threshold matter “the files, if there are any at all in the hidden
portions of the hard drives, are not themselves testimonial.”46
Despite the non-testimonial nature of the files themselves, under
certain circumstances the act of production may have sufficient
communicative qualities apart from the underlying documents sought,
triggering Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination.
Thus, constitutional privileges may be implicated where
“[c]ompliance with a subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the
papers demanded and their possession or control by the [party]” or
where production would indicate the party’s “belief that the papers
are those described in the subpoena.”47
2. Application of Act of Production Principles to
Encrypted Contents
In applying the principles spelled out in Fisher and Hubble
(discussed in Part II above), the Eleventh Circuit in Doe reasoned that
under the foregone conclusion principle “where the location,
existence and authenticity of the purported evidence is known with
reasonable particularity, the contents of the individual’s mind are not
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1342.
44. See, e.g., Doe II, 465 U.S. 605, 611-12 (1984). This so-called “private papers”
doctrine has drastically evolved since the early years of American jurisprudence when such
documents were considered to be protected both under the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments.
See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
45. United States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976).
46. United States v. Doe (Doe III), 670 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2012).
47. Doe II, 465 U.S. at 612-13 (1984) (citations omitted) (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410).
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used against him, and therefore no Fifth Amendment protection is
available.”48 At the same time, an act of production may be
testimonial where it conveys “some explicit or implicit statement of
fact” of the alleged material’s existence within the individual’s
possession or the material’s authenticity.49 The court thus used a twostep approach in tackling the encryption problem. To be deemed nontestimonial, an act of production must arise from (1) an individual
being compelled to perform a physical act rather than “make use of
the contents of his or her mind,” for example, to produce a key to a
safe containing documents, or (2) the testimonial aspects of
production are defeated by the “foregone conclusion” doctrine.50
Under the above framework, the court disagreed with the
Government that requiring Doe to produce the unencrypted contents
would be akin to requiring Doe to produce a key to a lockbox—
“nothing more than a physical non-testimonial transfer.”51 The court
reasoned that “requiring Doe to use a decryption password is most
certainly akin to requiring the production of a combination” as it
demands him to produce the “contents of his mind.”52 More
importantly, however, the act of production would also carry
testimonial implications that Doe has “knowledge of the existence
and location of potentially incriminating files; of his possession,
control and access to the encrypted portions of the drives; and of his
capability to decrypt the files.”53
Turning to the second exception, the court held that unlike in
Fisher, the testimonial aspects of Doe’s production were not a
“foregone conclusion.” The foregone conclusion doctrine operates to
defeat the constitutional ramifications of acts of production where the
testimonial aspects are otherwise known to the Government.54 Thus,
the witness’s concessions add “little or nothing to the sum total of the
Government’s information.”55 In compelling a witness to testify
under such circumstances, “no constitutional rights are touched[; t]he
question is not of testimony, but of surrender.”56
48. Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1344.
49. Id. at 1345.
50. Id. at 1345-46.
51. Id. at 1346.
52. Id. See also In re Boucher, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009), for
its narrowed subpoena request in Boucher, infra Section IV.A, note 63.
53. Id.
54. United States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976).
55. Id.
56. Id.
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While the Government was able to demonstrate that “the
combined storage space of the drives could contain files that number
well into the millions” it was unable to show that “the drives actually
contain any files, nor has it shown which of the estimated twenty
million files the drives are capable of holding may prove useful.”57
While the IRS, in Fisher, was fully aware of the specific documents
(though, not necessarily all of them) it sought and knew that they
were in the possession of the taxpayers’ attorneys, the Government
here could not show that “it possessed even a remotely similar level
of knowledge of the files on the hard drives at the time it attempted to
compel production from Doe.”58 Even though exact specificity in
subpoena requests is not required, “categorical requests for
documents the Government anticipates are likely to exist simply will
not suffice.”59
As a result, the court found that the Government was unable to
carry its burden under the foregone conclusion exception “to show
any basis, let alone shown a basis with reasonable particularity, for its
belief that encrypted files exist on the drives, that Doe has access to
those files, or that he is capable of decrypting the files.”60
3. Limited Immunity Was Not Sufficient
The remainder of the court’s opinion reversing the district
court’s civil contempt order against Doe was thus predetermined.
Since Doe’s act of production was sufficiently testimonial to warrant
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination protections, the district court’s
grant, per the Government’s request of only use immunity, to compel
Doe to testify was improper because such limited immunity is not coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination.61 Relying on
Kastigar v. U.S., the court reasoned that only “use and derivative use
immunity establishes the critical threshold to overcome an
individual’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.”62 It was not sufficient for the Government to request
and for the district court to grant such limited immunity to compel
57. Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1347 (11th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original). The nature of
the encryption program in this case, TrueCrypt, was such that it would also encrypt any unused
space rendering any distinction between unused space and actual data impossible to determine.
Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1349.
61. Id. at 1350.
62. Id. at 1351 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972)).
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Doe’s production since the files thus decrypted could still be used
against him and they are “directly or indirectly derived from”
compelled testimony.63
IV. INACCESSIBLE BUT “KNOWN” CONTENT
The two cases highlighted here represent Scenarios II and III,
respectively.
They are conceptually more nuanced and the
correctness of the outcome in each situation is more debatable. To
the extent that each holding may be jurisprudentially sound, questions
still remain as to whether the outcomes would have been the same had
the Eleventh Circuit case (discussed in Part III) preceded these two
decisions. The third case straddles the two categories. However, it
was ultimately resolved without a final judicial ruling and thus it still
remains to be seen how the Eleventh Circuit framework would play
out at the district court level.
A. Grand Jury Subpoena to Sebastian Boucher
The facts of Grand Jury Subpoena to Sebastian Boucher (In re
Boucher) arose out of a border search and a seizure of Boucher’s
laptop as he was entering the U.S. by car from Canada.64 When
Boucher’s laptop (which he admitted to be his) was inspected at
secondary screening, the inspector conducting the screening observed
that the computer contained over 40,000 images, some of which
appeared to be involving child pornography based on their file
names.65 After being given Miranda warnings, Boucher directed the
border agents to the location on his hard drive where he stored
pornographic material.66 A further inspection of that location on the
hard drive, led to the finding of a number of videos and images that
appeared to involve child pornography, at which point Boucher was
arrested, and his laptop was seized and shut down.67 When a forensic

63. Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1351.
64. In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009).
Generally, the border search doctrine provides an exception to Fourth Amendment’s protections
against unreasonable search and seizure. Thus, “[s]earches of closed containers and their
contents can be conducted at the border without particularized suspicion under the Fourth
Amendment.” United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008). This includes computers
and files contained therein. Id. Under the border search doctrine, electronic media may be
seized and transported away from the border for further forensic analysis for a limited period of
time. See, e.g., United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2011).
65. In re Boucher, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *4.
66. Id. at *5.
67. Id.
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examination was attempted at a later time and the computer was
rebooted, the particular portion of the hard drive containing
pornography was found to be encrypted by Pretty Good Privacy
(PGP), an encryption program, and thus, inaccessible.68 As a result,
the Government applied for and received a grand jury subpoena
directing Boucher to produce the password.69 At a later date, the
request was narrowed to require Boucher only “to produce an
unencrypted version of the [drive.]”70
The district court held that the testimonial nature which may
have existed with respect to the incriminatory act of production was
superseded by the Government’s knowledge of the existence and
location of the documents as per the foregone conclusion doctrine.71
Here, Boucher admitted that the computer was his at secondary
screening and, more importantly, accessed the drive in the presence of
the border agents who observed the general character of the files
present on the drive, including images of potential child
pornography.72
In a holding that appears more permissive in applying the
foregone conclusion doctrine, the district court observed that the
doctrine “does not require that the government be aware of the
incriminating contents of the files; it requires that the government
demonstrate with reasonable particularity that it knows the existence
and location of subpoenaed documents.”73
The conditions in In re Boucher as to the Government’s
knowledge were not present in the Doe decision. To the extent that it
needed distinguishing, the Eleventh Circuit observed that although the
Government need not have shown that it knew of the contents of the
files it sought in In re Boucher, a showing of the Government’s
knowledge that the files actually exist was still required thereunder.74
68. Id.
69. Id. at *6. Government experts specifically testified that they were unable to access
the relevant drive. Id. at *5.
70. In re Boucher, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *6.
71. Id. at *10.
72. Id. at *9.
73. Id. at *8. In doing so, the district court overturned the Magistrate’s finding that the
foregone conclusion did not apply because the government did not see every file on the drive
and therefore it did not know whether most files were incriminating. Id. Nonetheless, the
district court prohibited the Government from using Boucher’s act of production in their case to
authenticate the contents. Id.
74. Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1349 (11th Cir. 2011). Thus, in Boucher, the Government
need not have shown what was contained in a file labeled “2yo getting raped during diaper
change;” it was “crucial that the Government knew that there existed a file with such a name.”
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Further, there was no indication that the Government, “at the time it
sought to compel production [by Doe], knew to any degree of
particularity, what, if anything, was hidden behind the encrypted
wall.”75 The Eleventh Circuit seems to also require some independent
knowledge (as opposed to mere suspicion) as to the contents, in
addition to the location and the existence of the subpoenaed
documents.76 Such a limitation was apparent in the reasoning of the
Boucher court inasmuch as it did find that the border agents were
initially able to view certain files and “ascertained that they may
consist of images or videos of child pornography.”77
Under either approach, the fact that decryption78 and production
of the unencrypted data may provide the Government with additional
incriminating information as yet unknown to it is not necessarily
relevant for Fifth Amendment purposes.79 So long as the Government
makes the relevant threshold showing of knowledge, the potential for
revelation of additional information is not a bar to production.80
B. United States v. Fricosu
In United States v. Fricosu,81 Ramona Fricosu (along with her
ex-husband) was accused of engaging in certain fraudulent real estate
transactions and money laundering.82 In executing a search warrant

Id.
75. Id.
76. Doe’s act of production would be very similar to Hubbell’s inasmuch as prior to the
act of production; the Government has no knowledge as to the documents’ existence. Thus,
while the contents themselves are non-testimonial in nature (since their creation was not
compelled), the testimonial nature of the act of production which reveals the documents’
existence requires both use and derivative use immunity to meet the requirements of Kastigar.
77. In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *9 (D. Vt. Feb. 19,
2009).
78. Perhaps even the provision of a password may be compelled under this line of cases,
though it seems likely that such a request would be deemed a “product of the mind” in itself and
thus protected directly under the Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination. See,
e.g., United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 666 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (quashing grand
jury subpoena which called for defendant “to provide all passwords used or associated with
the . . . computer . . . and any files.”).
79. See Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1347 (“Case law from the Supreme Court does not demand
that the Government identify exactly the documents it seeks, but it does require some specificity
in its requests – categorical requests for documents the Government anticipates are likely to
exist simply will not suffice.”). This topic is discussed later in Section VI.
80. Compare United States v. Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (Fourth
Amendment and encrypted data) with United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2009).
81. United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Colo. 2012).
82. See Indictment, United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, (D. Colo. 2012) (No.
10-CR-00509).
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on her property, the FBI seized a number of computers ostensibly
belonging to Fricosu and others in her household.83 One laptop
computer found in Fricosu’s bedroom and tagged electronically with
her name was found to be encrypted with PGP.84 As was the case in
Boucher, the Government was unable to decrypt it on its own.85 As a
result, they sought a writ requiring Fricosu to produce the contents of
the encrypted drive based in particular on an intercepted conversation
that Fricosu had with her incarcerated husband in which she said, in
relevant part, that “it was on my laptop” and that she may have
encrypted it.86
Relying on the reasoning in Boucher, the court held that
Fricosu’s act of production would not be sufficiently testimonial
based on the doctrine of foregone conclusion as the Government met
its burden of proof in showing that the laptop in question either
belonged to Fricosu or Fricosu was the sole user thereof and that she
admitted as much during the intercepted conversation.87 Additionally,
although the holding is somewhat unclear and the discussion of the
elements of the foregone conclusion doctrine is absent, the court
found that:
There is little question here but that the government knows of the
existence and location of the computer’s files. The fact that it does
not know the specific content of any specific document is not a
88
barrier to production.

That latter conclusion is not present in Boucher. Recall in
Boucher, the border agents were able to ascertain in part the nature of
a number of the files on Boucher’s computer and, in particular, the
contraband nature thereof. There was no indication in Fricosu (and
there does not appear to be any discussion in the decision as to the
evidence actually sought and the particularity with which the recorded
conversation described the contents) that the Government could
identify with “reasonable particularity” what “it” was.89 Nevertheless,

83. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. at 1234.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1235.
87. Id. at 1237.
88. Id.
89. The elements of “reasonable particularity” with respect to electronic data seem to be
that “(1) the file exists, (2) the file is possessed by the target of the subpoena, and (3) the file is
authentic.” See Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1349 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Norwood,
420 F.3d 888, 895-96 (8th Cir. 2005)). See also Government’s Application under the All Writs
Act Requiring Defendant Fricosu to Assist in the Execution of Previously Issued Search
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just as in Boucher, Fricosu was only offered immunity for the act
producing the unencrypted documents, not their contents.90
The Eleventh Circuit, in discussing the Fricosu opinion,
distinguished the case by relying heavily on the recorded conversation
between Fricosu and her ex-husband. For all intents and purposes,
“Fricosu essentially admitted every testimonial communication that
may have been implicit in the production of the unencrypted
contents.”91
Fricosu appealed the finding of the district court. The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit did not resolve the question but instead
rejected the appeal as not ripe for adjudication under the rules of
finality.92 Subsequent to the district court decision, although there
were some indications by Fricosu’s attorney that she may have
forgotten or never known the password,93 she (or likely her exhusband) eventually provided the passwords which then were used
successfully by the Government to decrypt the laptop.94
C. In the Matter of the Decryption of a Seized Data Storage
System
This last criminal case has seen some interesting twists and
reversals of fortune for both the putative defendant and the federal
Government. The facts of the case are fairly run-of-the-mill as set
forth in the Magistrate’s decision.95 A warrant was issued for Jeffrey
Feldman’s residence allowing Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)
agents to enter and search Feldman’s premises for evidence of child
pornography, including electronic storage media.96 In the course of

Warrants, United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, (D. Colo. 2012) (No. 10-CR-0050901-REB), available at https://www.eff.org/node/58551 (last visited Apr. 25, 2012). There is a
potential argument that this is a very restrictive reading of the lowered thresholds set forth in
Fischer.
90. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1238.
91. Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1349, n.27.
92. United States v. Fricosu, No. 12-701, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 3561 (10th Cir. Feb. 21,
2012).
93. David Kravets, Defendant Ordered to Decrypt Laptop May Have Forgotten
Password,
WIRED
(Feb.
6,
2012,
2:55
PM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/02/forgotten-password/.
94. See Government’s Notice Regarding Compliance with Court’s Order of January 23,
2012, United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Colo. 2012) (No. 10-CR-00509-REB02).
95. Order Denying Application to Compel Decryption, In the Matter of the Decryption of
a Seized Data Storage System, No. 13-M-449 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 2013) (Callahan, J.).
96. Id. at 2.
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the search, before invoking his right to counsel, Feldman, a software
engineer, stated that he was the sole occupant of the residence
searched and that he had lived there for over 15 years.97
The FBI seized a number of storage devices, a number of which
it found to be encrypted.98 One of the unencrypted devices was found
to contain a peer-to-peer file-sharing program, the logs of which
seemed to indicate that certain files potentially suggestive of child
pornography were transferred therewith.99
Other unencrypted
computer logs appeared to indicate that the files so-named were
downloaded to the encrypted devices.100
As a result, the Government applied for an order under the All
Writs Act to compel Feldman to “assist in the execution of a federal
search warrant by providing federal law enforcement agents a
decrypted version of the contents of his encrypted data storage
system.”101
Initially, Magistrate Judge Callahan denied the order sought by
the Government. Applying the Eleventh Circuit rubric, the magistrate
found that although (1) the “existence and location of the [files] are
foregone conclusion” since circumstantial evidence from unencrypted
devices indicates presence of child pornography on the encrypted
devices, (2) Feldman may be capable of accessing the encrypted
portion of the drives given his computer engineering background and
his being the sole occupant of the residence searched, as a “close call”
matter, if compelled:
Feldman’s act of production which would necessarily require his
using a password of some type to decrypt the storage device would
be tantamount to telling the government something it does not
already know with ‘reasonable particularity’—namely, that
Feldman has personal access to and control over the encrypted
102
storage devices.

In an interesting twist, however, since Feldman was not charged
or brought before a grand jury at the time, the Government sought
reconsideration of its motion on an ex parte basis.103 On that motion,

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Order Denying Application to Compel Decryption, In the Matter of the Decryption of
a Seized Data Storage System, No. 13-M-449 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 2013) (Callahan, J.).
102. Id.
103. Bruce Vielmetti, Did U.S. Prosecutors Mislead Judge in West Allis Decryption
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the Government showed that, subsequent to the original order, it was
able to decrypt on their own a small portion of one of the encrypted
drives and was able to observe child pornography files as well as
Feldman’s personal files.104 The Government, thus, argued that this
discovery mooted any act of production concerns with respect to
“access and control” and the magistrate judge agreed, holding that “it
is a ‘foregone conclusion’ that Feldman has access to and control over
the subject encrypted storage devices.”105 On penalty of contempt,
Feldman was ordered to assist the Government with decrypting the
seized encrypted devices.106
This decision, however, did not stand for long. Upon finding out
about this ex parte decision, Feldman filed an emergency motion
seeking a stay of the magistrate’s latest order before the district court,
arguing, inter alia, that the ex parte nature of the order was
improper.107 Judge Rudolph Randa granted the stay and ordered
further briefing.108 Subsequent briefs have sparred over a number of
issues, including the propriety of the prosecutors’ actions and, in
particular, whether they misled the magistrate about the alleged
complexity of the computer system used by Feldman and Feldman’s
sophistication as a computer user in seeking to have the original order
reconsidered.109 Ultimately, the Government was able to crack one of
the drives seized, charged Feldman with possession, distributing or
receiving child pornography, and dropped its motion to compel
decryption.110

Case?,
MILWAUKEE
WISCONSIN
JOURNAL
SENTINEL
(July
23,
2013),
http://www.jsonline.com/news/crime/did-us-prosecutors-mislead-judge-in-west-allisdecryption-case-b9958202z1-216673531.html. The title of the article refers back to the original
search warrant which was filed as In the Matter of the Search of 2051 S. 102nd Street,
Apartment E, West Allis, No. 13-M-421 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 1, 2013).
104. Order Granting Ex Parte Request for Reconsideration of the United States’s
Application Under the All Writs Act, In the Matter of the Decryption of a Seized Data Storage
System, No. 13-M-449 (E.D. Wis. May 21, 2013).
105. Id. at 3.
106. Id. at 4.
107. See Declan Mccullagh, Judge: Child Porn Suspect Doesn’t Need to Decrypt Files,
CNET (June 4, 2013, 2:30 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57587670-38/judge-childporn-suspect-doesnt-need-to-decrypt-files/.
108. See id.
109. See Vielmetti, supra note 103.
For a further discussion of goal-oriented
exaggerations of computer users’ abilities, see infra Part VII.
110. Bruce Vielmetti, Federal Shutdown Slows Milwaukee Porn Encryption Case, but FBI
Busts Silk Road, MILWAUKEE WISCONSIN JOURNAL SENTINEL (Oct. 3, 2013),
http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/226206611.html; see also Motion to Dismiss Application,
In re The Decryption of a Seized Data Storage Sys., No. 13-M449 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 16, 2013).

FOLKINSHTEYN

2014]

4/27/2014 7:32 PM

A WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF

395

This case would have fallen in the gray area between Doe and
Boucher, though, given the precedent developed prior to this case it
would have been surprising if Feldman had not been compelled to
decrypt. However, since the relevant issue was resolved without a
final ruling on the facts, it remains to been seen how district courts
would apply the Eleventh Circuit framework.
V. WHAT ARE THE LESSONS OF THESE DECISIONS?
The divergence in the holdings above seems to rest on a number
of implicit and explicit premises which underlie the first three
Scenarios set out in Section I. One critical difference between the
outcomes in Boucher and Fricosu on one hand, and in Doe on the
other, is the amount of information revealed by the defendant. In the
former two instances, substantial information was arguably made
apparent to the Government through either initial cooperation by
Boucher or through tapped telephone conversations, respectively,
making the finding of foregone conclusion justified. In the latter
case, the Government was left wholly grasping at straws.
More generally, the novel nature of encryption issues seems to
leave the courts in search of appropriate analogies as to how to apply
the “private papers” doctrine. All documents at issue in these cases
are voluntarily created but, if they are produced in the condition in
which they are found, would be of no assistance to the fact-finder.
Although the foregone conclusion doctrine appears to serve as an
efficient mechanism to resolve certain questions relating to
encryption, better physical world analogs to the cryptographic process
are necessary in order to appropriately balance Fifth Amendment
protections with technological advances.
A. The Value of Silence
The decision in Boucher was predetermined by, in particular, the
border search to which Boucher was subjected and his initial
cooperation with the border agents which enabled them to actually
locate and identify the nature of the contraband files on his
computer.111 Similarly, although in Fricosu, as discussed in Part
IV.B, the holding is arguably less clear and perhaps even misapplies
Boucher, the defendant’s intercepted conversation with her exhusband provided a crucial link to strip Fifth Amendment protections
from her act of production. Yet, despite the courts’ finding in both

111.

See supra Part IV.A.
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cases that the foregone conclusion doctrine defeated the testimonial
aspects of the act of production (i.e., decryption), both defendants
were given the benefit of limited immunity for the act of production
by the district courts. Implicit in that conclusion is the recognition by
the courts of the vestigial testimonial nature of production despite the
contrary ultimate findings.112
Both the Boucher and Fricosu decisions illustrate the application
of Fifth Amendment principles to Scenarios II and III enumerated
above. Contemporaneous knowledge of the contents of encrypted
data can be used to defeat an assertion of privilege to the act of
production by way of application of the foregone conclusion
principle. Although one may quibble with the opaque reasoning of
the two cases, the conclusions reached in the two decisions do not
appear inconsistent with existing jurisprudence. Ultimately, the
amount of actual knowledge required to foreclose the assertion of
privilege is unclear and is likely to be determined on a case-by-case
basis.
The Eleventh Circuit decision is illustrative of Scenario I and is
much better at spelling out its reasoning and providing a seemingly
straightforward test for when the foregone conclusion operates to
defeat the defendant’s exercise of his right against self-incrimination.
For the first time at the appellate level, the Eleventh Circuit held that
decryption and production of encrypted files is not a physical act of
non-testimonial nature, akin to providing a key to a lockbox or a
handwriting sample.113 Although the physical comparisons to digital
encryption do seem to be lacking,114 it certainly is a step in the right
direction in recognizing the complexity of the digital age. It remains
to be seen how the test would operate under circumstances which are
not as clear-cut and straightforward, particularly when the putative
defendant may not have been as careful about remaining steadfastly
silent.
Additionally, the identity of the owner of the storage media was
not really in question in any of the three cases that were resolved with
finality. Thus, under the rubric of the foregone conclusion doctrine,
the elimination of the testimonial aspect of production indicating to

112. It is particularly notable here that the grant of immunity occurred regardless of the
apparent foregone conclusion as to the testimonial aspects of production. Cf. Doe II, 465 U.S.
605, 613 (1984) (“Unlike the Court in Fisher, we have the explicit finding of the District Court
that the act of producing the documents would involve testimonial self-incrimination.”).
113. Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1346 (11th Cir. 2011).
114. See discussion infra Part V.B.
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whom the hardware belonged was obviously not sufficient, standing
alone, to overcome constitutional objections. What was in dispute,
particularly in Doe, was the Government’s knowledge as to the
contents or, alternatively, the nature or the existence of the contents
themselves. In other words, the focus in Fricosu was primarily on the
physical location and existence of the potentially incriminating
information, which was ascertained from collateral sources, namely,
an intercepted phone call. In Doe, on the other hand, and likely in
future cases dealing with encryption issues, the discussion focused in
particular on how the Government can meet its burden of showing
with reasonable particularity its “level of knowledge as to the files on
the hard drives at the time it attempt[s] to compel production.”115 In
light of Hubbell, such knowledge must have an independent
confirmation.116
In a way, these cases represent two extremes of the foregone
conclusion spectrum. In particular, Boucher (and to a lesser extent
Fricosu) is on one end where location and content are known while
Doe is on the other end where the content is not known. Doe is the
classic example of when the foregone conclusion doctrine cannot
apply in light of the Government’s inability to demonstrate any
showing of knowledge of the relevant facts to defeat the defendant’s
assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
B. The Nature of Encryption
The Doe decision is particularly notable for the fact that the
court explicitly recognized that encryption by itself cannot be viewed
as an act carrying a bad intent. The court noted that:
We are not persuaded by the suggestion that simply because the
devices were encrypted necessarily means that Doe was trying to
hide something. Just as a vault is capable of storing mountains of
incriminating documents, that alone does not mean that it contains
117
incriminating documents, or anything at all.

There are numerous private legitimate uses for encryption,
ranging from protection against identity theft or data theft to
protection of information for personal reasons. In some states, certain
businesses are mandated by law to encrypt personal consumer data,

115.
116.
117.

Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1347 (emphasis in original).
See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 29 (2000).
Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1347.
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for example, in Massachusetts and Nevada.118 Some jurisdictions
have even obliquely observed that it may be incumbent upon the legal
profession to utilize encryption in order to protect clients’ confidences
under the rules of professional conduct.119
As discussed, Courts faced with the issue of encryption have
relied on the Fifth Amendment framework applicable to physical
world analogs. As a general matter, courts begin their analysis by
consistently holding that the private papers line of cases applies to the
underlying unencrypted documents—inasmuch as their initial creation
was obviously voluntary—be they tax papers,120 images of child
pornography,121 or business records.122 The courts then continue by
observing (as the Eleventh Circuit decision has recognized) that the
password itself is testimonial in nature, in the way a combination to a
safe box is testimonial, refusing to accept the key and lock
approach.123
Whether encrypted files should be treated similarly to other
voluntarily created documents is, however, a question worth

118. Miriam Wugmeister, New Massachusetts Regulation Requires Encryption of Portable
Devices and Comprehensive Data, MORRISON & FOERSTER (Sept. 23, 2008),
http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/bulletins/14495.html.
119. New York City Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 1994-11 (1994) (“A lawyer should exercise
caution when engaging in conversations containing or concerning client confidences or secrets
by cellular or cordless telephones or other communication devices readily capable of
interception, and should consider taking steps sufficient to ensure the security of such
conversations.”). In Texas, the Computer and Technology Section of the State Bar recommends
that attorneys use encryption software to avoid running afoul of consumer data breach
notification laws or ethical requirements of keeping client confidences. Jason Smith, Ron
Chichester, & Michael Peck, Keeping Client Data and Your Law License Secure, 76 TEX. BAR
J. 103, 104 (2013). Given the scienter requirement of Texas’s Rule 1.05 relating to confidential
information, an attorney may be subject to discipline if he loses an electronic device containing
confidential client information or such a device is seized by the government at the border. Id.
To teach attorneys about encryption, the Computer and Technology Section held a hands-on
workshop at the State Bar Annual Meeting, providing attendees with a copy of TrueCrypt and
other similar applications. Id.
120. United States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 408-09 (1976) (stating that tax and accounting
documents voluntarily created should not ordinarily be protected from disclosure). Although the
Fisher court punted on the ultimate question of actually overruling Boyd, “the papers demanded
here are not [the taxpayer’s] ‘private papers.’” Id. at 414.
121. See, e.g., In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006 (D. Vt. Feb.
19, 2009); Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Pearson, No. 1:04CR-340, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32982 (N.D.N.Y. May 24, 2006).
122. Doe II, 465 U.S. 605, 611 (1984).
123. Same situation seems to have played out in other cases where the Government
appears to have specifically sought the underlying unencrypted contents rather than the
passwords themselves. See, e.g., United States v. Kirschner, No. 09-MC-50872, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 30603 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2010).
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considering in light of the potential conceptual difference between the
creation of the original and the encrypted copy.124 A number of
analogies have been proposed for encryption in this context including
encryption as translation, as a safe, as well as a “shredded safe.”125 It
has been argued that none of these analogies standing alone prevent
compelling of a witness to produce decrypted contents under
appropriate circumstances with an appropriately worded subpoena.126
But these analogies do provide avenues (both for the prosecution and
the defense) for arguing when such compelled production rises (or
does not rise) to the level of a testimonial act of production requiring
both use and derivative use immunity.
1. As Translation
The encryption as translation analogy proposes that an
encryption algorithm acts on a document as a process of mechanical
translation, turning an original voluntarily created plaintext document
into a ciphertext incomprehensible to anyone but the document’s
creator.127 Even though the analogy may be unsuccessful inasmuch as
the original character of the document arguably remains unchanged
(once the decryption algorithm is applied) and all electronic
documents by definition require “translation” from their essential
nature as 1s and 0s into readable documents by means of
hardware/software,128 it may be useful in conceptualizing when
translation can be a testimonial act. As we have seen above, courts
have generally accepted that an individual’s act of production of an
unencrypted document is of a testimonial nature inasmuch as it
implicitly acknowledges that the individual is able to “read” the
encrypted document, although such testimonial aspects may be
defeated by the application of the foregone conclusion doctrine.
This recognition also bears parallel examples in the physical
realm. In U.S. v. Ragauskas, a deponent invoked his right against
self-incrimination “in refusing to translate a document presented to

124. Nathan K. McGregor, The Weak Protection of Strong Encryption: Passwords,
Privacy and Fifth Amendment Privilege, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 581, 599 (2010).
125. Id. at 600-05.
126. Id.; see also Philip R. Reitinger, Compelled Production of Plaintext and Keys, 1996
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171 (1996) (holding plaintext should be treated the same way as ciphertext).
127. Production of the ciphertext (a voluntarily created document itself) would thus be in
compliance with a potential subpoena and nothing more would be required.
128. See McGregor, supra note 124, at 604; see also Reitinger, supra note 126, at 176
(“[L]egal status of encrypted documents should be no different from any other machine-readable
or machine-translatable records.”).
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him for inspection” as well as in refusing to answer questions
pertaining to his activities with the Lithuanian military during World
War II, his date of birth, the number of languages he speaks and
similar issues.129 Although the decision leaves a lot to be desired in
terms of clarity on this issue, the court held that Ragauskas was
entitled to invoke the privilege because information thus obtained
could be incriminating as it might “demonstrate that Ragauskas
belonged to the Lithuanian military units that allegedly committed
atrocities during World War II.”130
A similar analysis should also apply not only to documents
written in a foreign language and a witness’s understanding thereof,
but documents originally written in code. Contrary to a situation
where a document is converted into ciphertext from a plaintext
original, compelling a witness to produce a deciphered version of the
document would not only be precluded by the Fifth Amendment’s
protections of an individual’s “product of the mind” but also the
prohibitions spelled out in Fisher and Hubbell against compulsory
creation of new documents.131 Further, neither the voluntary nature of
the document’s creation nor the foregone conclusion doctrine would
be applicable in a case like this—whether or not the Government has
any independent knowledge as to the individual’s ability to
understand the cipher or to read a document would generally not have
any bearing on its ability to compel the individual to forgo the
exercise of his Fifth Amendment privilege. To the extent that an
original plaintext document is innocently (yet purposefully) destroyed
subsequent to the creation of a ciphertext, similar reasoning should
apply.132
2. As a Coded Safe or Keyed Lockbox
This analogy posits that encryption acts similarly to placing
plaintext documents into a safe locked either by means of a key or a
combination.133 In the Eleventh Circuit decision, the court held that
requiring an individual to use a decryption password “is most

129. United States v. Ragauskas, No. 94 C 2325, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2313, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 23, 1995).
130. Id. at 11.
131. See, e.g., McGregor, supra note 124, at 600 (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391, 409 (1976)).
132. Interesting questions may arise—thankfully beyond the scope of the paper—as to
what effect mandatory document retention policies or willful destruction of documents has on
the issues discussed here.
133. See McGregor, supra note 124, at 601.
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certainly more akin to requiring the production of a combination
because both demand the use of the contents of the mind.”134
Moreover, the court recognized that the Government’s requests for
production or subpoenas in such circumstances are never about the
password or key in itself—the ultimate goal is the production of the
“files being withheld”—further strengthening the combination
analogy.135
There is an underlying assumption in this analogy that, as is
evidenced by the application of the foregone conclusion principles,
the nature of the documents thus locked does not change—the
original still remains intact, so to speak, waiting to be unlocked.136
The conservation of the original document is, however, questionable
to the extent that the application of the encryption algorithm
transforms the original into incomprehensible ciphertext absent the
reversal of the process (with or without the creator’s input).137 The
ciphertext can be produced and viewed in tangible form and it is, for
all intents and purposes, the only document that exists until
mechanical mathematical manipulation is applied to it to make it
comprehensible. For example, in Doe, in seeking to establish that
certain files actually existed on the drive, “the Government introduced
an exhibit with nonsensical characters and numbers, which it argued
revealed the encrypted form of data that it seeks.”138
Court decisions to date have stopped their analysis here by
simply holding that compelling an individual’s use of the contents of
his mind to decrypt the contents of the drive and provide the same to
Government is a testimonial act (which may or may not be defeated
by the foregone conclusion principles). However, that approach may
be problematic for constitutional purposes because it arguably fails to
recognize the dual physical and mental nature of the act of decryption.
The analogy may also be unsatisfactory (to both proponents and
opponents of strong encryption) in its lack of recognition of (1) the
differences between mechanically securing content in a safe as
compared to cryptographically by encryption, and (2) the essentially
unlimited breadth of content which may be stored cryptographically
as compared to documents stored within the physical limitations of a

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1346 (11th Cir. 2012).
See McGregor, supra note 124, at 601.
Id.
Id. at 602 (calling this the “shredded safe analogy”).
Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1340.
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coded safe.139 Law enforcement personnel can always gain access to
a coded safe by mechanical means if a defendant fails to comply with
a court order to provide combination thereto or even without seeking
such compulsion. However, a strongly encrypted drive is often
unlikely to be breached without a defendant’s cooperation. At the
same time, the increasing use of electronically stored information for
a variety of licit and illicit purposes creates an incentive to properly
secure such data by encryption on the one hand and increases its value
to those who seek to gain access to it, on the other. The physical
parameters of mechanical safe storage, on the other hand, necessarily
limit the exposure of content compelled to be disclosed.
3. Reconceptualizing Decryption
As noted above, if a document is originally written in cipher, an
individual cannot be compelled to render it readable even if the
Government is in possession of the document so created, since such a
request would both require the creation of new documents as well as
call for the use of the individual’s contents of the mind. To take it
one step further, if the original document was handwritten in cipher
by means of a simple mathematical function for which simple
calculations were done on a computing device (e.g. calculator) the use
of a mechanical device should not in theory defeat the above analysis
either.140
It may be logical to extend this hypothetical to the situation
(common today) where the ciphertext documents are created wholly
by means of mechanical computing without an individual’s
involvement in higher level calculations beyond the creation of a
passphrase for the software that performs the encryption process.
Thus under this rubric, “the decryption and production of the contents
of the hard drives” may be equal to creation of a new document rather

139. See, e.g., John E. D. Larkin, Compelled Production of Encrypted Data, 14 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH L. 253, 272 (2012).
140. For purposes of this hypothetical, I obviously overlook the lack of complexity of such
a cipher and the ease with which the Government can break it, thus rendering any subpoena
unnecessary. At the same time, generally speaking, book ciphers (technically defined as codes)
may be incapable of being decrypted by an unauthorized third party within a reasonable period
of time. SINGH, supra note 2, at 31. An early example of a book code in American history dates
back to the American Revolution when Benedict Arnold employed the first volume of the Fifth
Oxford Edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England to pass coded
communications to the British. See J. Terrence Stender, Too Many Secrets: Challenges to the
Control of Strong Crypto and the National Security Perspective, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
287, 300 (1998).
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than production of an existing decrypted one.141 The courts today,
however, do not view encryption in such a fashion. Instead the
mental process of decryption has no significance beyond that of a
non-testimonial physical act with possible testimonial implications.
It may be that reconceptualizing decryption is unnecessary in
light of the Eleventh Circuit’s careful application of the foregone
conclusion doctrine. Further, to date, in every precedent referenced
herein, when the Government sought grand jury subpoenas or writs
for production of the contents of encrypted drives, the courts always
acknowledged in their findings that the Government’s attempts to
decrypt the contents had been unsuccessful.142 Such observations
may serve as a tacit understanding that the testimonial aspects of acts
of production are greater than they seem. On the other hand, such
grants of immunity may be simply a rote application of precedent
without any deeper meaning and thus open to further re-evaluation,
particularly when law enforcement need so indicates. Regardless, a
more protective stance on compelled decryption does not leave the
Government without any tools to proceed. A grant of immunity
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 6002 would invalidate any
constitutional objections to an order to decrypt. Failure to disclose
after a grant of immunity can lead to an imposition of civil and
criminal sanctions.
VI. COMPELLED PRODUCTION OF ILLEGAL CONTENTS
In both Hubbell and Fisher, the Supreme Court dealt with the
issue of compulsion in connection with documents that, in and of
themselves, were not unlawful to possess. For example, in Fisher, the
documents in question were retained copies of individual tax returns
as well as accountants’ work papers pertaining to the returns;143 in
Hubbell, the produced documents were various financial documents
from which the charging prosecutor later gleaned various tax

141. Should the ability to compel depend on the form of the original document ab initio?
If a document is created by being typed on a computer, but it is not saved as plaintext and
instead saved automatically in encrypted form, is there a plaintext document at all?
142. See, e.g., United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1234 (D. Colo. 2012)
(“[A]gents have been unable to decrypt it.”); In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13006, at *5-6 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009) (“The government is not able to open the
encrypted files without knowing the password. In order to gain access to the Z drive, the
government is using an automated system which attempts to guess the password, a process that
could take years.”); Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1339 (“The grand jury subpoena issued because the
forensic examiners were unable to view the encrypted portions of the drives.”).
143. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 394 (1976).
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crimes.144 Neither case dealt specifically with documents the
possession of which alone constitutes a crime. Nor have any cases
tackled directly a situation where a defendant’s compelled decryption
lead to the discovery of evidence relating to unrelated criminal acts.145
Courts are likely to be faced with situations where they are
required to compel putative defendants to decrypt contents when the
individual stands accused of crimes of possession, for example, child
pornography, pirated media content, and the like. Under current
precedent, such evidence (whether encrypted or not) is likely
voluntarily created and thus is not entitled to self-incrimination
protections absent testimonial act of production characteristics.146
Similarly, as per Scenario IV above, use of evidence which was
gleaned from compelled decryption of data, portions of which turn
out to be relevant for prosecution of unrelated criminal acts (i.e., the
existence of which was not a foregone conclusion), would not be
foreclosed by the application of the Fifth Amendment privilege. They
are likely to be deemed discovered in “plain view”. Whether recent
developments in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence will or should
preclude such evidence being used in the prosecution of unrelated
offenses is discussed below in Part VIII.
But, in such a case, the compelled production of unencrypted
contents may be reasonably likened to Hubbell’s assembly and
production of specifically designated categories of documents “where
the prosecutor needed respondent’s assistance both to identify
potential sources of information and to produce those sources” rather
than a mere act of non-testimonial act of production.147 And, as seen
above in Parts II and III, none of the cases dealing with compelled
decryption have involved the Government seeking the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum or a writ as a primary investigative tool
without first attempting to decrypt the data on its own. Such an act of
production would have greater testimonial significance than in cases
involving business records or tax records which are in and of

144. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 32 (2000).
145. The extent to which the Boucher decision contemplated the plain view exception is a
debatable issue. See In re Boucher, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *8 (“Second Circuit
precedent, however, does not require that the government be aware of the incriminatory contents
of the files; it requires the government to demonstrate with reasonable particularity that it knows
of the existence and location of subpoenaed documents.” (emphasis in original)).
146. See McGregor, supra note 124, at 605-08, for discussion as well as logical difficulties
in giving greater protection to encrypted contraband as opposed to encrypted documentary
evidence such as dairies.
147. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 41.
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themselves not criminal to possess and whose creation may be
required by the relevant law.148
In fact, some precedent is available to support this stricter
proposition. Ordinarily, production of physical evidence is not
testimonial in nature—a defendant may be compelled to produce a
blood sample or a handwriting sample, to put on a shirt, or to
participate in a line up.149 But, under certain circumstances, such
compelled production may carry significant testimonial aspects and
greater Fifth Amendment concerns.
In People v. Havrish, the Court of Appeals of the State of New
York held that a defendant’s production of an unlicensed handgun
which led to his prosecution for possession of same was privileged
under the Fifth Amendment.150 The defendant was originally charged
with unrelated crimes of assault and kidnapping among others.151 As
a condition of the bail, the defendant was required to “[s]urrender any
and all firearms owned or possessed.”152 He complied with the order,
surrendering a number of long guns as well as a pistol which was later
confirmed to be unlicensed.153 As a result, the defendant was
subsequently charged with a criminal possession misdemeanor.154
In holding that the defendant’s act of production was testimonial
and incriminating in nature, and thus was subject to the application of
the privilege against self-incrimination, the court ruled out the
application of the foregone conclusion doctrine.155 The defendant’s
act of production was the sole confirmation of the handgun’s
existence and possession of same by the defendant.156 The court
observed that “[b]efore defendant revealed that he had possessed a
revolver [pursuant to court order] neither the court nor the police were
aware that defendant owned a handgun.”157 Furthermore, the
production was in itself incriminating inasmuch as “by the time
defendant produced the weapon, he had provided the police with

148. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), for a discussion of the required
records exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege.
149. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408 (collecting cases).
150. People v. Havrish, 8 N.Y.3d 389, 397 (2007). Of note here, however, is the
automatic application of the privilege under New York state law.
151. Id. at 391.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 395.
156. Havrish, 8 N.Y.3d at 395.
157. Id.
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proof of virtually every element of the offense of criminal possession
of a weapon.”158 As a result, the handgun’s suppression “was
warranted in the weapon possession prosecution” and “the
suppression of this evidence necessitated the dismissal of the
accusatory instrument.”159
VII.THE DANGERS OF REACTIONARY OVERREACTION
The difficulties in separating the testimonial aspects of the act of
production from the non-testimonial aspects require courts to
approach such situations without a predisposition against a defendant
who chooses to engage in lawful conduct of encrypting his or her
data.160 As argued by Paul Ohm, such a person should not be viewed
as a mythical “Superuser” who wanders the digital highways with
anonymous destructive impunity; courts should be wary of accepting
the Government’s insinuations in that regard as well.161 Although
“the Fifth Amendment would not be violated by the fact alone that the
papers on their face might incriminate the taxpayer, for the privilege
protects a person only against being incriminated by his own
compelled testimonial communications,”162 the testimonial character
of acts of production lack clarity and requires fact-intensive
examination on a case-by-case basis. Of note here is the concurrence
by Justice Thomas in Hubbell, which noted that Fisher has introduced
“difficult parsing of the act of responding to a subpoena duces
tecum.”163
Lowering the hurdles to cover self-incrimination issues with
respect to encryption would result in an imprudent disconnect
between the treatment of physical and digital evidence.164 Law

158. Id. at 396.
159. Id. at 397.
160. The consequences of a refusal to comply with a subsequently determined incorrect
order can be particularly dire. For example, in Doe III, the witness spent about 8 months in jail
for civil contempt before the 11th Circuit ordered his release after hearing Doe’s oral argument
on appeal. Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1340 n.12.
161. Paul Ohm, The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk and Harm Online, 41 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1327, 1333-35 (2008). The article also discusses the investigatory breadth already
possessed by the state with respect to virtually warrantless Internet surveillance. Id. at 1352.
162. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409 (questioning the expansive “private papers” doctrine
established by Boyd).
163. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 56.
164. See, e.g., Ohm, supra note 161, at 1353-54. Contra Andrew Ungberg, Note,
Protecting Privacy through a Responsible Decryption Policy, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH 537 (2009)
(calling for a separate approach to decryption which requires special particularized warrant
requirements and a circumscribed use of the plain view exception).
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enforcement personnel are constantly confronted with facts the
discovery of which is impossible without self-incriminating
compulsion, for example, the location of a murder weapon or other
document or object necessary to prosecute a particular defendant.
Yet, in such situations, an individual may not be compelled to
disclose the location of such evidence despite law enforcement’s
inability to locate or identify the same. To force a suspect to decrypt
data in the absence of strong indications of foregone conclusion
places digital evidence on lesser footing than physical evidence at a
time when evidence (in the form of information) is increasingly stored
electronically and more crimes relate to use or misuse of
electronically stored information. To the extent that data is encrypted
by means resulting in “plausible deniability,” compelled decryption
without significant indicia of the foregone conclusion principle would
be an obvious violation of the right against self-incrimination.165
Similarly, to treat physically encrypted evidence memorialized in
fixed form differently from evidence encrypted electronically, does
not make much sense.
Further, the effect encryption has on the investigative function
should not be overestimated. While encryption may make certain
information inaccessible in a specific instance, it does not prevent law
enforcement personnel from engaging in the multitude of other
investigative techniques available to them. For example, law
enforcement has a relatively free hand in conducting Internet
surveillance without notice to the investigative target.166 Similarly,
cell tracking, which includes both caller location and text message
content, is conducted without the involvement of the target through
subpoena and non-subpoena requests to cellphone carriers.167 In 2011
alone, the number of such requests totaled over 1.3 million.168 As
information is increasingly communicated wirelessly, this relationship
is bound to get more intrusive.169 Further, since a grant of use and
derivative use immunity legally overcomes any self-incrimination
concerns, it still remains one of the most powerful tools available to

165. Such a method of encryption was involved in Doe III. See discussion supra Part III.
166. Ohm, supra note 161, at 1353-54.
167. Eric Lichtblau, Wireless Firms are Flooded with Requests to Aid Surveillance, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 2012, at A1.
168. Id.
169. The recent disclosures of surveillance capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community,
although thankfully beyond the scope of this paper, further illustrate the vulnerability of
electronic data of all kind.
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overcome constitutional objections to decryption.170 The perceived
threat posed by encryption to the investigative function should not be
used as a pretext to criminalize previously innocent behavior or to
limit constitutional protections.
In light of the novelty of encryption issues and the lack of
precise mapping to existing precedent and physical world parallels,
courts should tread very carefully in this arena and find an appropriate
non-reactionary balance between protecting individual rights and
privileges on the one hand, and law enforcement needs on the other.
It remains to be seen whether the foregone conclusion principles as
clarified in Doe are sufficient in this regard, particularly because of
the relative simplicity of the facts therein as well as the arguably
broader testimonial characteristics implicit in relevant acts of
production relating to encrypted documents as discussed above.
VIII. FOURTH AMENDMENT RAMIFICATIONS
A similar conflict is currently developing under the rubric of the
Fourth Amendment with respect to the plain view exception and
search and seizure of electronically stored information (ESI). The
resemblance between the challenges of compelled decryption and
discovery of unrelated incriminating evidence and seizure of
electronically stored information and discovery of same requires a
closer examination of the underlying principles behind the Fourth
Amendment protections and the recent developments in the issuance
of search warrants relating to ESI. Ultimately, I propose that a
stronger protective stance under the Fourth Amendment but not under
the Fifth Amendment would be an untenable outcome leading to an
inappropriate equilibrium between individual rights and state power.
A. Overview of Relevant Jurisprudence
The Fourth Amendment speaks to the prohibitions on searches
and seizures and sets forth the basic requirements of probable cause
and particularity in the issuance of warrants and the extent of searches
and seizures conducted pursuant thereto. It states that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,

170. To the extent that a court order does not result in the target’s disclosure of the
unencrypted contents, it will, of course, result in a criminal contempt order and, subsequently, a
civil contempt order. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Witness Chanie Weiss, 703 F.2d 653 (2d Cir.
1983). The situation is no different than any other court order requiring an individual to testify,
who, subsequently, refuses to do so.
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shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
171
seized.

Although simple on its face, the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is not a model of judicial clarity.172 For example, the
developed standard of “reasonable expectation of privacy” is
employed to determine whether a particular state action constitutes a
“search.”173 This doctrine’s application witnesses a spectrum of
seemingly related exceptions and case-by-case rules. One of the
relevant exceptions to the warrant requirement relevant to the analysis
here is the “plain view” exception. As set forth in Horton v.
California, the exception applies to situations where (1) law
enforcement personnel is present lawfully at the place where evidence
can be viewed (e.g., a valid search warrant), (2) law enforcement
personnel must have “lawful right of access” to the object itself, and
(3) the incriminating nature of the evidence must be “immediately
apparent.”174 As a corollary, in the course of a lawful search, law
enforcement personnel is not permitted to manipulate an object to
bring it into plain view or to make the objects incriminating character
apparent.175
B. ESI Implications
With the explosion of electronically stored information, the
“plain view” exception now faces a wholly unprecedented doctrinal
challenge of self-definition. Unlike a search of physical objects and
spaces, the enormous storage capacity of a computer makes such
searches “extraordinarily invasive.”176 A lawful seizure and search of

171. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
172. Cf. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
HARV. L. REV. 476, 479 (2011) (collecting rules and proposing that the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is an on-going re-calibration of technological advances and law enforcement
needs).
173. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
174. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990). The court logically observed that
“[i]f an article is already in plain view, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve any
invasion of privacy.” Id. at 133. Doctrinally, the plain view exception speaks more
appropriately to seizures rather than searches. Id.
175. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (reviewing an exigent circumstances search
for weapons where a police officer turned over stereo equipment to check serial numbers). See
also Matthew Dodovich, Note, The Plain View Doctrine Strikes Out in Digital File Searches, 6
I/S J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 659, 664 (2011).
176. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96 VA.
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storage media, for example, hard drives, back-up drives, and the like,
puts into play any evidence thus discovered whether or not the
evidence was specified in the search warrant or wholly unrelated to
the crime investigated arguably through the operation of the plain
view doctrine.177 In fact, judges usually issue extremely broad
warrants relating to computer data, spurred on by tales of cybercriminals’ unparalleled abilities.178 Yet, at the same time, such a
broad sweep of the plain view doctrine may cut against the
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment for warrants to
specify “the place to be searched and the . . . things to be seized.”179
Additionally, files stored on electronic media cannot be considered in
“plain view” in the traditional sense of the term—they must be
manipulated in order to reveal their nature.180
To mitigate the severity of the outcome, a number of courts have
imposed ex ante restrictions on computer searches conducted pursuant
to a warrant, including conditions limiting the seizure of computer
itself, conditions which impose time limits on the electronic search,
conditions on how the electronic search must be conducted, including
search terms and data segregation, and lastly, conditions on the return
of seized hardware.181
For example, in United States v.
Comprehensive Drug Testing,182 after a previous final and then
withdrawn decision which made certain ex ante restrictions
mandatory, the Ninth Circuit set forth a list of suggested guidelines to
be used by magistrate judges in determining the reasonableness of a
warrant for electronic data. Among the guidelines were the need to
insist on government’s waiver of reliance on the plain view doctrine
with regard to digital evidence, the use of search protocols and the use
of specialized non-investigative personnel to search the seized
media.183 On the other hand, a few courts have approached the
problem on an ex post basis, deciding the reasonableness of a
L. REV. 1241, 1255 (2010).
177. Id.
178. Ohm, supra note 161, at 1354.
179. For discussion of issues in application of the plain view doctrine to electronic
searches that do not exist with physical searches, see Andy Boulton, E-Discovery Rules and the
Plain View Doctrine: The Scylla and Charybdis of Electronic Document Retention, 37 J. CORP.
L. 435 (2012).
180. Id. at 444-45.
181. See generally Kerr, supra note 176.
182. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (en
banc).
183. See Kerr, supra note 176, at 1257. For an in-depth discussion of the case, see
Dodovich, supra note 175, at 665-78.
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conducted search on a case-by-case basis.184
Orin S. Kerr has suggested that unrestrained ex ante regulation
of search warrants is inadvisable and impedes development of proper
constitutional outcomes.185 Others have proposed that searches and
seizures of electronic media are conceptually no different than search
and seizures of physical property and thus no special oversight is
necessary in this realm.186 On the other side of the debate, proponents
argue that such limitations provide a necessary backstop to
government overreach and the devolution of narrow warrants into
general ones.187
What is relevant for the purposes of self-incriminating
compulsion under the Fifth Amendment is the potential divergence in
the protections provided by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,
resulting in an outcome where certain evidence, which would
otherwise not be reachable by the operation of a warrant’s
particularity and probable cause requirements, could still be obtained
through self-incrimination by the operation of the foregone
conclusion principles.
First, on balance, the operation of the plain view doctrine in
conjunction with the particularity and reasonableness requirements of
the Fourth Amendment is much better in tempering the dangers of
pretextual searches or fishing expeditions with respect to physical
objects.188 Although the subjective intent of the search is generally
not examined by the courts, the particularity requirements limit the
type of evidence that may be discovered in “plain view” as the police
can only look “in places and containers large enough to contain the
specific physical evidence sought.”189 As a result, a search of
physical evidence is considered unlikely to result in a general search
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, even if the probable cause for a
warrant issued was related to a criminal act that was ultimately not the
object of the search.190
Digital searches, on the other hand, are more susceptible to
184. See, e.g., United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 2011).
185. Kerr, supra note 176, at 1277.
186. Josh Goldfoot, The Physical Computer and the Fourth Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J.
CRIM. L. 112 (2011).
187. Paul Ohm, Massive Hard Drives, General Warrants, and the Power of Magistrate
Judges, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1 (2011).
188. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in the Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531,
577 (2005) (discussing the need to re-evaluate the plain view doctrine in digital searches).
189. Id. at 568.
190. Id.
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government abuses and involve an increasing generality of the search
itself. Today, computers store a wealth of information by and about
the user with and without the user’s input or (sometimes) consent.191
Absent an ex ante limitation on the mechanics of the search, a warrant
for computer hardware necessarily subjects the whole universe on the
storage media to the search. A warrantless seizure, conducted without
any judicial oversight whatsoever, is even more invasive.192 At the
same time, given the virtually limitless capacity of storage media
available to the average consumer, a pretextual search sufficiently
grounded in probable cause relating to a minor offense (undoubtedly
present on many a computer) is virtually guaranteed to bring to the
surface not only evidence of criminal wrongdoing but other
potentially incriminating or impeaching material that in itself does not
constitute a criminal act.193
The foregone conclusion jurisprudence under the Fifth
Amendment should be mindful of the developments with respect to
the plain view doctrine and ex ante restrictions relating to digital
searches. Lesser protections can not only create new avenues for law
enforcement overreach, but are also likely to turn every defendant
into a compelled self-informant as use of encryption becomes more
widespread to secure increasing volumes of digitally stored personal
information.
CONCLUSION
In today’s digital world, more and more criminal prosecutions
involve dealing with electronic data. The occurrence of electronic
data as evidence is not limited to the white collar crime sphere and
can be found in the prosecution of traditional street crime as well.
Encryption poses a great challenge to the law enforcement function
because it makes electronic evidence qualitatively different from
physical tangible evidence, and at times, essentially impossible to
analyze. At the same time, physical tangible evidence may be
actually replaced solely by electronic evidence—so that assigning
fewer constitutional protections to the latter could greatly affect the
balance of individual rights in criminal prosecutions.
On the other hand, encryption is becoming standard operating
procedure by individuals, white collar professionals and corporations
191. Ohm, supra note 187, at 6-7 (discussing the proliferation of data stored not only on
users’ personal computers but also with third parties).
192. See Kerr, supra note 188, at 569.
193. Id. at 582.
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for legitimate personal and business reasons. In considering
encryption issues, the courts should be mindful not only of the
challenges that encryption presents to law enforcement, but also of
the unintended consequences of creating rules that can greatly affect
individual constitutional rights and protections. Simply demonizing
those who choose to use encryption and creating rules to eliminate the
effects of encryption on law investigative capabilities, overlooks the
realities of today’s digital world.
The precedent to date has not been particularly instructive as to
how the principles of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination will apply to encryption in the gray area in the middle.
As the case law reads today, I would argue that it should not matter
what kind of encryption program is used and the exact algorithm it
applies to, for example, file space versus blank space, or how it
operates to hide or otherwise make apparent the use of encryption on
a particular device. Under Doe, the focus appears to be on the
government’s independent minimum knowledge of the encrypted
contents, which may be obtained not only through a putative
defendant’s cooperation, but also through advanced wiretapping and
eavesdropping as well as more traditional human asset techniques.
Under that approach, current jurisprudence leaves a lot of discretion
to the courts in determining when a particular act of production rises
to the level of a constitutionally protected testimonial deed. It is thus
incumbent upon the courts to understand not only how encryption
works but also how important and pervasive electronic data has
become in today’s society. The Supreme Court has already heard
cases relating to technological possibilities of electronic tracking and
how such technology affects the balance established by the Fourth
Amendment.194 Perhaps, in this technological era, the next challenge
in the Fifth Amendment arena will come from a petitioner in a case
dealing with encryption issues who heeds the call of Justice Thomas
in Hubbell, where he concluded his concurrence with the following
observation:
None of the parties in this case has asked us to depart from Fisher, but
in light of the historical evidence that the Self-Incrimination Clause may
have a broader reach than Fisher holds, I remain open to a
195
reconsideration of that decision and its progeny in a proper case.

194.
195.

See Jones v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 56 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

